In recent decades, scholars have developed an interest in Nietzsche’s use of “thick” moral psychological concepts, such as emotions and reactive attitudes. This development coincides with a surge in interest among both philosophers and social scientists in the emotions and moral psychology more generally. Although there is some controversy about the exact catalogue, lists of basic emotions typically include surprise, fear, anger, contempt, disgust, sadness, and joy. An emotional reaction grounds a moral foundation when it motivates behaviors and social signaling that tend to erect and enforce a set of norms. Despite the attention to Nietzsche’s use of emotions, the literature has tended to lump all emotional states together, or to make few distinctions beyond positive and negative valance. This issue of JNS will make an important contribution to the literature by soliciting papers on discrete emotions. We are interested in papers on topics such as guilt, resentment, and shame in Nietzsche’s works, as well as less-discussed but still-prominent emotions such as disgust, contempt, curiosity, trust, doubt, and awe.
Rebecca Bamford (Quinnipiac University & University of Fort Hare)
Gudrun von Tevenar (Birkbeck, University of London)
Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)
Submissions Deadline: August 1, 2018 (Choose Article Type: ‘Special Issue Article’)
Publication Date: JNS 50.1 (Spring 2019)